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Spending Health Care Dollars Wisely:
Can Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Help?
One question that is rarely asked, at least in polite company, is whether
we’re getting the most health improvement possible for our money. In
other words, are all the things that we do in medicine really worth it?
That is where cost-effectiveness comes in. As a nation, we have been
unwilling, at least publicly, to look explicitly at the value, in terms of
improved health outcome, that we get for our health care dollars. With
advances in medical technology putting unsustainable pressure on
health care costs, our historical reluctance to measure value for health
care may have to change.
I start this brief by describing cost-effectiveness analysis as a method of
determining the value, measured in Quality-Adjusted Life Years, of
medical technologies as they are applied to treat, diagnose, or prevent
various conditions. Based on this information, I then argue that some
highly beneficial, low-cost procedures are significantly underutilized,
and that other medical technologies may be overutilized based on the
amount of health benefit they yield in relation to their cost. Next, I give
examples from current research, my own and that of colleagues,
illustrating how cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to guide the use
of new diagnostic testing technologies (such as DNA or RNA typing of
infectious agents or identification of genomic or proteinomic markers
in cancer patients).

Measuring Value for Health Care Dollars
In last year’s Lourie Lecture, David Cutler, my colleague from Harvard
University, argued that health care is good value on average. He asked
the question, “Are the benefits of health care worth what we pay for
it?” and his answer was generally “Yes, the benefits of health care are
worth what we pay for it.” But that is not the same thing as saying that
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all health care is good value. I submit that some health care is better
value than the average and some health care is worse. Even though the
average may be acceptable, there are some medical practices that are
not worth the money we pay for them. Cost-effectiveness analysis is a
method of determining the value of health care treatment.
Dollars
By money we mean the net resources consumed in providing the
intervention, measured in dollars. This is relatively easy to determine,
although not as easy as you might think. For now let’s just pretend that
it’s relatively easy to measure the resources consumed in providing a
health care intervention: the cost of the hospitalization, the physicians,
the devices, the drugs, and all the rest of it. That’s the money part.
Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
Value in health care, I submit, is best measured in terms of
improvements in health outcomes, which may be increases in life
expectancy or improvements in the quality of life. First, we assign
relative weights to different qualities of life, ranging from perfectly
healthy, at the top of the scale, or 1, to dead, at the bottom of the scale,
or 0. Between those extremes are various levels of health, ranging from
maybe having a little cold, which could be a .99, to having a very
serious disability, such as after a stroke or possibly the end stages of
cancer.
Where do these weights come from? They derive from what people say
they want. For example: How much relative value do people place on
having relief from chest pain relative to having relief from fever or
upper GI symptoms? We survey people in the community and ask them
what their preferences are for various health conditions; this is integral
in measuring health improvement. Then we take these weights that
people assign to being in various states of health, multiply them by
their durations, add them up, and we get a number of quality-adjusted
life years (QALYs). See, for example, Bell et al. 2001.
Measuring Quality-Adjusted Life Years for an Individual
Figure 1 is a schematic of how one would measure the number of
quality-adjusted life years lived by an individual who might be a
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candidate for a treatment for asymptomatic coronary artery disease,
such as a statin drug. Suppose this patient receives an initial treatment,
is asymptomatic for some period of time, and then has a setback, starts
experiencing chest pain, angina, for some period of time. This angina is
certainly worse than being perfectly healthy. So the height of that bar is
lower than the 1.0 for the asymptomatic period of time. After some
time with angina, the patient undergoes surgery, recovers pretty well,
but still has some minor limitations after the surgery. Eventually the
patient suffers a major heart attack, then after a few years of being
bedridden, dies. What is the number of quality-adjusted life years? It is
essentially the total area underneath these bars. Our measure of health
improvement, then, is an integrated measure of length and quality of
life.
Figure 1. Quality-Adjusted Life Years: Heart Attack Example

Utility Weight

1.0

0.5

Asymptomatic

Minor Limitations
Angina
Bedridden

0.0
Treatment Started

Surgery

Major Heart Attack

Death

Measuring Value for Money
Now how do we measure the value for money from a medical
technology? How can a medical technology or clinical intervention
affect costs and health outcomes? First, it can either increase or
decrease cost. What do I mean by “decrease cost”? Some technologies
may actually save money down the line, which is more than enough to
offset the cost that you have to pay for it. The conventional wisdom is
that prevention often falls into this cost-saving category, but it turns out
that not all prevention is cost-saving. In fact, most prevention really is
no more likely to be cost-saving than treatment. It could happen that a
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treatment is cost-saving, and if it happens that a treatment is costsaving and also provides an improved health benefit, an improved
health benefit in terms of longevity or quality of life or both, then the
answer is “Yes, we want this technology.” We don’t even have to ask
the question of value for money because it not only provides health
improvement but also saves money. This situation is represented by the
upper right-hand box in Figure 2.

Incremental Health Effect

Figure 2. Cost-Consequence Space
Incremental Cost

+

-

+

?

Yes

-

No

?

The lower left-hand box in this table is equally clear; it costs money
and it harms health outcome. We don’t want those. The problem, the
battleground where we can’t afford to do everything for everyone, is
located in the boxes with the question marks, and particularly the one in
the upper left-hand corner. This is where most of health care is: it costs
money and it provides a benefit. How can we evaluate these kinds of
medical technologies?
The Cost-Effectiveness Ratio: QALYs per $1 Million
One measure is literally value for money. How many quality-adjusted
life years does this technology buy for each dollar we spend on it?
Net gain in health outcome (QALY)
Net increase in health care cost ($)

= Value for money

It is the ratio of the quality-adjusted life years gained, the gain in health
outcome, relative to the increase in health care costs. This is what I
mean by value for money.
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With that methodology it’s possible to make comparisons across
medical interventions, in terms of how much health improvement you
get for every dollar spent on the technology.
Table 1. How Much Health Improvement (Quality-Adjusted Life Years)
Can One Million Dollars Buy?
Beta-blockade post myocardial infarction (MI), high risk
>200
Statin therapy, prior heart disease
100-200
Beta blockade post MI, low risk
Antihypertensive treatment, diastolic blood pressure (DBP)>105
Cervical cancer screening every 4 years
50-100
Screening sigmoidoscopy every 5 years
Combination antiretroviral therapy for HIV
tPA (vs. streptokinase) for heart attack
Coronary angiography and revascularization post MI, high risk
20-50
Antihypertensive treatment, DBP 95-104
Dialysis for end-stage renal disease
10-20
Statin therapy, low density lipoprotein (LDL)>190, high risk
Coronary angiography post MI, low risk
Statin therapy, LDL 160-190 or >190 and low risk
<10
Cervical cancer screening every year (vs. 2 years)
Sources:Goldman et al. (1991), Prosser et al. (2000), Edelson et al. (1990), Frazier et al.
(2000), Freedberg et al. (2001), Winkelmayer et al. (2002), Kuntz et al. (1996), Kim et al.
(2002), Chapman et al. (2000).

Table 1 lists various medical procedures. The numbers on the right side
tell you how many quality-adjusted life years, on average, this medical
technology will buy for every $1 million spent on it. At the top of this
particular list is beta blockade—beta blocker drugs used after
myocardial infarction—for patients who are at high risk for subsequent
cardiac death. This is a very cost-effective intervention; more than 200
quality-adjusted life years are gained for every $1 million spent.
The “Gold Standard” of Twenty QALYs per $1 Million: Treatment
of End-Stage Renal Disease
The procedure highlighted near the bottom—dialysis for end-stage
renal disease—which is in the category of 10 to 20 quality-adjusted life
years gained per $1 million, is an interesting one. In 1972 Congress
passed the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Amendment to Public
Law 92-603, which expanded Medicare coverage of persons under age
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65 who are disabled to include those with chronic renal failure, thus
creating the only virtually universal health coverage program in the
United States based solely on a disease. The best treatment for chronic
renal failure is a kidney transplant; however, if a transplant isn’t
available, these Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to dialysis. One of
the earliest published cost-effectiveness analyses (Klarman et al. 1968)
estimated that dialysis cost roughly $50,000 per year of life gained, or
20 QALYs per $1 million. Surprisingly, that ratio, $50,000 per year of
life gained, has had tremendous durability for patients on dialysis. Even
as the cost of dialysis went up, the benefits also went up as
immunosuppressant drugs were introduced and proved effective
(Winkelmayer et al. 2002). This benchmark of 20 QALYs per $1
million is frequently used as a benchmark for society’s willingness to
pay for another life-year—although lower thresholds such as 10
QALYs per $1 million have also been proposed (Cutler and Richardson
1998). Presumably we ought to be willing to pay for everything above
it on the list as well. Indeed, there are several interventions above it on
the list:
• Beta blockade post-MI is more cost-effective than dialysis, not only
for high-risk patients but even for some low-risk patients.
• On the other hand, coronary angiography after a heart attack, with
the purpose of identifying patients who can benefit from coronary
revascularization, either surgery or angioplasty or stent implants, can
buy QALYs at about 20-50 per $1 million for high-risk patients, but for
low-risk patients it falls near the bottom of the list at less than 10
QALYs per $1 million.
• Cervical cancer screening every four years is a very cost-effective
thing to do. It is known to be beneficial and it is good value for money,
50-100 QALYs gained per $1 million. But doing a pap smear every
year instead of every 2 years gains fewer than 10, maybe a lot fewer
than 10, QALYs per $1 million.
These examples show that it is not really correct to say that a
technology either is or is not cost-effective. Rather, it depends on how
you are going to use it, which patients are going to get it, how often you
are going to do it. It is the way you use technologies that determines
how cost-effective they are.
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Cost-Effectiveness Ratios: Dollars per QALY
It is much more traditional to express these ratios upside-down, to
measure dollars per QALY instead of measuring quality-adjusted life
years per $1 million. The medical literature contains numerous studies
that report cost-effectiveness ratios in terms of dollars per qualityadjusted life year gained. These tend to run in the thousands up to the
tens of thousands, even up into the hundreds of thousands of dollars per
QALY.

Reallocating Current Resources to Highly CostEffective, Widely Applicable Technologies

Total Health Improvement (QALYs)

There is a wide range, maybe a factor of 100, between the most and the
least cost-effective medical interventions that are widely used (Table
1). And there is surprisingly little difference in the penetration of these
technologies at the top of the list versus the penetration of these
technologies at the bottom of the list into patient care. So there is a lot
of room for reallocation of resources. We could improve our health
outcomes as a community by taking some of the money that’s going
into the technologies at the bottom and reallocating them to the
technologies at the top, which are being underutilized.
Figure 3. Health-Maximizing Resource Allocation
Hmax

Slope = Marginal Health Gain per Dollar

Slope = Average Health Gain per Dollar

15
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

Figure 3 illustrates the total possible health improvement due to
medical care, measured in quality-adjusted life years, for the amount
we choose to spend. There is a little hash mark at 15% of the gross
domestic product (GDP) to indicate our current level of health care
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spending nationwide. The average health care gain per dollar is the
slope of the diagonal line: this is the ratio of how much we get to how
much we spend, and it is quite steep, representing good value of money
on average. But look at the last percentage point or so of our health care
dollars; they’re really not buying very much. We’re getting up to what
Alain Enthoven (1980) calls “flat-of-the-curve medicine,” where there
is little or no health improvement per dollar.
Suppose that as a community we decide that we want our health care
resources to be spent in the way that gives us the most possible health
improvement as a community. What should we do?
We should make sure that the interventions that give us the most value
for money, the most health improvement per expenditure (QALYs per
$) are done first, in the first part of the graph, where the slope is very
steep and there is a lot of health improvement for a little bit of money.
This includes beta blockers after MI and childhood immunizations; this
is the really good-value-for-money medicine. We would want to make
sure that everybody who needs those interventions gets them. So far,
we’ve spent maybe 1/10% of GDP, and we’ve already gotten a fair
amount of health improvement. Then we slide upward along the curve
as we move down the list in Table 1 to the interventions that have
slightly less value for money. We keep adding technologies until we hit
our budget, 15% of the GDP.
At this point, there is still more medical technology available that we’re
not doing. If we’re only willing to spend 15% of the GDP, we’re going
to have to forego some potential health improvement.
But that isn’t how we allocate health care resources in this country.
Instead, we tolerate situations where some highly cost-effective
medical interventions don’t get done at all (Figure 4). Yes, we do the
cost-effective interventions that we can’t not do, such as emergency
appendectomies, but we skip over a few cost-effective interventions,
maybe because they’re not very popular: colonoscopies, for example.
People aren’t beating down their doctor’s doors to get colonoscopies.
So we tolerate a situation where only a fraction of the population who
could benefit from a colonoscopy to screen for colon cancer actually
gets one. We skip over a few things until we reach less cost-effective
technologies. Then, when we hit our 15% spending level, we have not
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Total Health Improvement (QALYs)

maximized the potential health improvement. We’re only getting part
of the health improvement that we could get.
Figure 4. Inefficient Resource Allocation
Hmax
Hactual

Slope = Marginal Health Gain per Dollar

Slope = Average Health Gain per Dollar

15
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)

If, starting at this point, we were to decide to add in all these
underutilized but cost-effective medical interventions, we would end up
spending even more. So instead we tolerate the fact that we’re not
getting as much health improvement as we could for a country that
spends 15% of the largest gross domestic product in the world on
health care. We tolerate less than full utilization of good medical
technologies to avoid spending even more than we are on health care.
Underutilized Recommended Medical Technologies
Table 2. Poor Adherence to Quality Indicators:
De Facto Cost Containment?
Percent of
Recommended Care
Received
Type of Care
preventive
54.9
acute
53.5
chronic
56.1
Mode of Care
medication
68.6
laboratory testing or imaging
61.7
surgery
56.9
counseling or education
18.3
Overall
54.9
Source: McGlynn et al. 2003, tables 3 and 4.
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McGlynn and colleagues (2003) conducted a study on the percentage of
recommended care that was received in different categories of care: on
average only about 50 to 60 percent of recommended care is actually
being delivered. What would it mean to increase that to 100 percent? It
would mean more cost. But many of these underutilized services are
cost-effective. They’re better value for money than a lot of what we’re
doing. Examples of underutilized services include:
• Flu vaccine for people over the age of 65. Studies have shown that
this might even save more money than it costs, or at worst might cost
$12,000 per QALY gained, which is a very good buy (Coffield 2001,
Tables 1,2). Yet only 66 percent of Americans over 65 got flu vaccine
in 2001 (CDC 2001, Table 7.1), and despite public education efforts
only 74.5 percent of those on Medicare in 2003 received the vaccine
(National Committee for Quality Assurance 2004, 36). This proportion
was almost certainly lower in 2004 because of the nationwide shortage
of flu vaccine.
• Getting lipids managed after coronary heart disease events such
as heart attacks. Statin drugs are very cost-effective for people who
have already had a coronary attack and are at high risk of subsequent
events. The cost per quality-adjusted life year is less than $10,000 for
most risk groups, and even for lower risk women it is only about
$40,000 per QALY (Prosser et al. 2000). And yet in 2003 only about
65 percent of people with commercial insurance or Medicare who
could benefit from these medications were getting them, and only 39
percent of those on Medicaid (National Committee for Quality
Assurance 2004, Appendix 1).
• Colorectal cancer screening of people over the age of 50. Annual
fecal occult blood testing (FOBT) is very cost-effective, less than
$20,000 per QALY (Frazier et al. 2000). Even colonoscopies or
sigmoidoscopies every 5 years cost less than $50,000 per QALY,
which is the magic number for kidney dialysis. And yet as of 2003 only
47.4 percent of commercially insured Americans and 49.5 percent of
Medicare recipients received FOBT in the measurement year,
sigmoidoscopy or double contrast barium enema within the last four
years, or a colonoscopy within the last nine years (National Committee
for Quality Assurance 2004, 32).
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We tolerate this underutilization, and we restrict access to care, so that
not only doesn’t everybody get the beneficial services, but we make it
difficult for some people to get any services. Again, the net effect is
that we end up spending a large amount of money but get less benefit
than we could, and we find that there’s a lot that we are doing that is
less beneficial per dollar than things that we are not doing.

Evaluating New Medical Technology
To evaluate a medical technology, we have to decide how it is going to
be used, and then compare different uses. Most technologies that were
worth developing in the first place are going to be effective, and even
cost-effective, for some people some of the time. But there may be
other people or other situations where they are much less cost-effective.
Levels of Implementation
We have to look at the cost-effectiveness, the ratio of the incremental
cost to the incremental gain in QALY, for different levels of
implementation or adoption of that technology, where the levels of
implementation are defined by:
• who gets it (the target population)
• how we deliver it (modality), what particular form of the technology
are we going to use, and
• how often we are going to do it (frequency).
Example: Cervical Cancer Screening
These technology, modality, and frequency questions are nicely
illustrated by a study that Sue Goldie and colleagues recently did on
cervical cancer screening in clinical practice (Kim, Wright, and Goldie
2002).
The major cause of cervical cancer is human papillomaviruses (HPVs),
a group of more than 100 known types of viruses (National Cancer
Institute 2004). Some HPVs cause warts, or papillomas, which are
benign, but others are associated with certain types of cancer. HPVs
that are more likely to lead to the development of cancer are labeled

11

Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
“high-risk,” as opposed to “low-risk” viruses that rarely lead to cancer.
Even the majority of high-risk HPV infections go away on their own
and do not cause cancer.
Both high-risk and low-risk HPVs cause the growth of abnormal cells
in the cervix, which can be detected by means of a pap smear. A pap
smear removes a small amount of squamous, or epithelial, cells from
the surface of the cervix. Among the pap smears performed annually in
this country, about 2 million result in findings that are neither
unequivocally normal nor cancerous, but are described as “atypical
squamous cells of uncertain significance (ASC-US).” It’s been a matter
of controversy what to do when the findings are equivocal, as in ASCUS. The least costly strategy, which would probably be considered
malpractice in some parts of this country, is to ignore those atypical
findings, basically treat them as if they were normal pap smears. The
standard of care, however, has been to repeat the pap smear until the
results are unequivocal.
Another approach to these atypical findings is a colposcopy, which may
include freezing the abnormal cells or a cone biopsy, to determine with
virtual certainty whether there is a lesion there or not.
In 1999 the FDA approved a new technology, the Digene HPV DNA
test, with which it is now possible to detect HPV virus in patients, and
to distinguish whether it is a high-risk or a low-risk type. This DNA
test is more expensive than a pap smear. Is it worth it?
Kim, Wright, and Goldie (2002) performed a cost-effectiveness
analysis of four management strategies for following up ASC-US
findings: immediate colposcopy; HPV DNA testing, with a follow-up
colposcopy if high-risk HPV types are detected; repeated pap smears;
and reclassifying ASC-US as normal, that is, ignoring the equivocal
result. They concluded that “reflex HPV DNA testing provides the
same or greater life expectancy benefits and is more cost-effective than
other management strategies for women diagnosed as having ASCUS.” Table 3 summarizes their findings.
These are incremental costs per life year gained, not quality-adjusted,
but in cervical cancer the goal is basically to prevent fatal cancer. So
cost per life-year pretty much captures what we’re interested in (except
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that all these ratios would be slightly higher if they were expressed as
costs per QALY, because the life years gained are in less than perfect
health). Compared to doing nothing, doing a pap smear every 5 years
and ignoring the atypical findings is a very cost-effective thing to do
($7,100 per life year), but we can do better at only a little bit more cost.
Instead of ignoring the atypical findings we could follow them up with
an HPV test which, compared to doing nothing, would gain additional
life-years at only about $12,000 apiece. The new pap smear technology,
using liquid-based methods, is more expensive than the conventional
pap smear, but it is also more effective, more sensitive and specific, and
it turns out that it is good value to use the liquid-based technology.
Table 3. Incremental Cost-Effectiveness of ASC-US
Management Strategies and Screening Intervals
Incremental
Strategy
Cost/LY
Liquid-based, ignore ASC-US, 5 years
$7,100
Conventional, HPV, 5 years
12,100
Liquid-based, HPV, 5 years
20,300
Liquid-based, HPV, 3 years
59,600
Liquid-based, HPV, 2 years
174,200
Liquid-based, HPV, 1 year
794,000
Liquid-based, colposcopy, 1 year
1,800,000
Source: Kim, Wright, and Goldie 2002

Intervals. We also find that these expensive technologies—the liquidbased pap smear, and the human papilloma virus test—to work up
atypical pap smears are very cost-effective as long as we test every five
years. If we start thinking about doing it every 3 years, as is now
widely recommended, the cost per life year gain is about $60,000,
roughly equivalent to kidney dialysis. If we screen more often, say
every 2 years or 1 year, the additional gain per dollar spent is very
small. Or, as shown by these big numbers, the additional cost per life
year gained is very high. What we also conclude is that these new
technologies—liquid-based pap smears and the HPV test—are quite
cost-effective, but that the annual pap smear is not. High tech wins out
over low tech.
Policy has changed, at least in part, because of this study. The
American Cancer Society guideline committee that was set up to reexamine cervical cancer screening in the United States in light of these
new technologies concluded that the HPV test should be done to work

13

Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
up atypical pap smear results, but that screening every 3 years, at least
until there’s an abnormal or atypical finding, is sufficient (Saslow et al.
2002).
Example: Genotypic Antiretroviral Resistance Testing (GART) to
Guide HIV Therapy
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the virus that causes AIDS
(Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). Left untreated, HIV
infection can damage a person’s immune system and progress to AIDS
(AIDSinfo 2004). HIV is a retrovirus, a type of virus whose genetic
information is contained in RNA rather than DNA. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides treatment
guidelines that recommend a combination of three or more
antiretroviral medications in a regimen called Highly Active
Antiretroviral Therapy, or HAART. Using HAART has dramatically
reduced HIV-related mortality and morbidity: a successful drug
regimen reduces the amount of virus so that it becomes undetectable in
a patient’s blood. However, the initial HAART can fail for several
reasons: (1) these drugs may cause negative side effects, some of which
may lead patients to discontinue treatment; (2) the HIV can mutate
while a person is taking anti-HIV medication; or (3) drug-resistant
strains may take over if the virus is not adequately suppressed by
medication. Second and subsequent drug regimens are less effective in
reducing a patient’s viral load, largely because of drug resistance.
My colleagues and I recently did a cost-effectiveness study of a
relatively new technology using genotyping for patients with HIV who
have failed at least one antiretroviral treatment regimen (Weinstein et
al. 2001). A Genotypic Antiretroviral Resistance Test, or GART,
determines if the HIV in a particular patient has become resistant to the
drugs the patient is currently taking or to the drugs that the patient’s
physician is considering prescribing next. The test analyzes a sample of
the virus from the patient’s blood to identify mutations that are
associated with resistance to specific drugs. Thus it can help identify
the drugs to which these patients are likely to respond, or to which their
strain of HIV has not yet developed resistance, and increase the
effectiveness of the next anti-HIV regimen. It is an effective
technology. But it is also expensive, about $400 in 2001.
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And GART is only modestly effective. It can increase the suppression
rate of the virus in the second- and third-line regimens from 14% to
20%, up to maybe 30%, but that is still not nearly as effective as the
first-line regimens. So there is a lot of resistance to adopting this
technology.
In our study, we used a model, a so-called state transition decision
analytic model: think of it as a “black box” of people with HIV
infection. This model synthesizes evidence from clinical trials, from
cohort studies such as the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study, efficacy of
the treatments from clinical trials, and the efficacy of genotype testing
from clinical trials. We put all these numbers into our model and out
came our cost-effectiveness result, which is that, comparing a world
without genotype testing to a world with genotype testing, patients with
AIDS can gain about 2.5 months of QALY, and that the cost per
quality-adjusted year of life gained is about $16,000. This is less than
kidney dialysis, even less than a lot of those very high-value
technologies in Table 1. It falls in the same range as treating high blood
pressure for people with fairly high diastolic blood pressures, cervical
cancer screening even every 4 years, or screening sigmoidoscopy for
colon cancer every 5 years.
Basically this study says that if it’s worth treating HIV with
antiretroviral drugs, it’s worth doing the genotype test. To some, that
was a surprising conclusion. It shows that expensive technology can be
good value, but you have to look at how it’s being used, and whom it’s
being used on.
Example: HER-2 Testing and Trastuzumab Therapy for
Metastatic Breast Cancer
Breast cancer is a general term used to describe several different
cancers that occur in the breast. One particularly aggressive breast
cancer involves a genetic alteration that generates extra copies of the
HER-2/neu gene, which sends protein signals to cells to grow and
multiply normally. If the cell has extra HER-2/neu genes that produce
too much signal protein, the growth signals are out of control, and
breast cells reproduce abnormally and form a cancer (see
http://www.vysis.com/Herceptin_35577.asp). Approximately 25% of
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breast tumors are of this type. The HER-2 gene was linked with breast
cancer in 1987.
The drug trastuzumab, produced by Genentech Incorporated under the
name Herceptin, is designed to block excess HER-2 protein. It is a
monoclonal antibody that was approved by the FDA in 1998 to treat
metastatic breast cancer in women whose tumors exhibit HER-2 protein
overexpression (extra amounts of protein) or gene amplification (extra
copies of the gene). Like many new drugs, it targets the tumor cells that
overexpress the HER-2 protein. It is administered in combination with
conventional chemotherapy, and randomized controlled trials show that
trastuzumab improves the response rate of the tumors and the duration
of the response, increases the time to progression of the cancer, and
even increases overall survival. It is an effective drug, but it is
expensive. Moreover, only 20% to 30% of women with breast cancer
can actually benefit from it.
There are two kinds of tests to identify the women who can benefit
from Herceptin.
• The immunohistochemistry (IHC) assay, which costs only $85 or
so, measures HER-2 protein present on the surface of the tumor cells.
The test results are expressed as 0, 1+, 2+ (weakly positive), and 3+
(strongly positive). A test result of 3+ indicates that the patient is HER2 positive, but results of 2+ or even 1+ may occur in women who are
HER-2 positive.
• The fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) test measures the
HER-2/neu abnormality at the DNA level, that is, the number of HER2/neu genes in the cell nucleus, and it is significantly more accurate
than the IHC test. But it costs $400.
Using the less expensive IHC test alone, about 8% of women who
could benefit from Herceptin and would be identified as candidates to
benefit from Herceptin if they got the FISH test, are missed by the
inexpensive test, because there are 8% false negatives. On the other
hand, of the women who truly can not benefit, 1.7% would be
identified as strongly positive and could get Herceptin unnecessarily
and without benefit, based on the IHC test results alone.
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Is it worth doing the $400 FISH test instead of the $85 IHC test to
avoid missing the 8% of women who could benefit, and also to avoid
unnecessarily giving Herceptin to the 1.7% of women who would be
identified as positive or strongly positive (even more if you include the
weakly positive results), but who really aren’t going to benefit?
Our cost-effectiveness study (Elkin et al. 2004) analyzed five test-treat
strategies based on results from clinical trials. The comparison strategy
was no test and chemotherapy alone. This was compared to four
strategies that involved various ways to identify and treat patients with
Herceptin: (1) IHC test, Herceptin if the IHC result was 2+; (2) IHC
test, Herceptin if 3+, confirm 2+ with FISH and give Herceptin if FISH
results were positive; (3) FISH, Herceptin if FISH results were
positive; and (4) no test, Herceptin to all patients.
What we found was that doing anything is expensive per unit of
benefit. This is because of the poor prognosis with metastatic breast
cancer, and because the patients most likely to benefit from Herceptin
have the poorest prognosis to begin with. Table 4 shows the costs per
QALY gained.
Table 4. Costs per QALY Gained for Test-Treat Strategies
Strategy
Dollars
QALYs
$/QALY
No test, chemotherapy for all
$43,300
1.28
IHC test, FISH for 2+,
$53,700
1.36
$125,000
Herceptin for FISH +
FISH, Herceptin for +
$54,700
1.37
$145,000
IHC Test, Herceptin for 2+
$57,500
1.36
Dominated
No test, Herceptin for all
$79,200
1.37
Dominated
Notes: (a) The $/QALY is the ratio of the added cost to the added
QALYs, comparing each strategy to the next less costly one. For
example, the $/QALY for “IHC test, FISH for 2+, Herceptin for FISH +
is calculated as ($53,700-$43,300)/(1.36-1.28). Dollar amounts are
rounded. (b) Dominated means that the strategy is both less effective
(fewer QALYs) and more costly than at least one of the other
strategies. The last two strategies are dominated by the strategy
“FISH, Herceptin for +”; their costs are higher but their QALYs are
the same or lower.
Source: Elkin et al. 2004.

In contrast with the $15-20 thousand per QALY for AIDS drugs and
resistance testing for AIDS treatment, and in contrast with $50,000 per
QALY for kidney dialysis, these cost-effectiveness ratios are over
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$100,000. In this context, the difference between using the $85 IHC
test and the $400 FISH test is very small. You can conclude from this
that if you are willing to spend the money to use anything at all, even to
use Herceptin in the first place, you should probably be willing to use
the expensive test to be sure that you get the drug to the right patients.
Is it worth spending $125,000-$145,000 to gain one QALY for women
with metastatic breast cancer? Well, it’s hard to say no to that question,
but it does raise an interesting, and provocative, issue. A lot of women
who should be getting screening mammograms aren’t getting them.
Maybe if we made sure that all the women who could prevent this
cancer by getting mammograms got them, we could do more good than
by using these drugs. Of course that raises very difficult ethical issues.
Do we want to say “no” to patients with cancer?
The conclusions from this analysis are that if targeted treatment is
worth doing, that is, if giving Herceptin is worth doing at all, then so is
the more accurate and expensive test. But also that this whole set of
interventions, both the testing and the treatment, have a relatively high
cost-effectiveness ratio compared to other therapies and screening
procedures for breast cancer.

Who Cares About Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?
Government Agencies
You would think that in the United States the government would care.
You would think that our representatives in Washington and in our
state capitals would care that we’re getting the most health value for
our money. To a certain extent they do care, but publicly our
governments have been reluctant to embrace cost-effectiveness analysis
(Neumann 2004).
The Centers for Disease Control has taken a leadership position in
using cost-effectiveness analysis in formulating guidelines for
vaccination and screening programs, but those are basically
recommendations.
You would think that Medicare and the Medicaid agencies in the states
would be using cost-effectiveness analysis, but they have pretty much
avoided it like the plague. For political reasons Medicare has never
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used cost-effectiveness analysis, at least openly or officially, and
Medicaid agencies have only recently begun to look at it. In fact, as
soon as our paper about the cost-effectiveness of genotype resistance
testing in HIV was published in the Annals of Internal Medicine, I got a
call from somebody in the Florida Medicaid office: “We saw your
paper. We’re trying to get through the state legislature a law that will
allow reimbursement for genotype resistance testing. Can you advise us
on how to evaluate it?” Because the legislature was interested and was
willing to provide reimbursement on a trial basis, the state Medicaid
agency was interested in evidence that it would be a good use of state
funds.
Virtually the rest of the developed, industrialized world is waist deep in
cost-effectiveness analysis. In the United Kingdom, which admittedly
has a very different health care system, they have set up an organization
called the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, with the beautiful
acronym NICE, which requires cost-effectiveness analyses of
pharmaceuticals and other technologies prior to a recommendation
from NICE to the National Health Service regarding reimbursement.
This agency has really been a full employment act for my colleagues in
the UK who are doing some wonderful work, both on methodology and
application of cost-effectiveness analysis. The National Health Service
has actually put some restrictions on reimbursement for new drugs and
technologies on the strength of cost-effectiveness analysis.
This is also true of other countries in Europe, in Australia, and in
Canada. The Australian government and the Ontario provincial
government in Canada were the first to require that reimbursement
under their drug benefit programs be guided, and are still guided in
part, by cost-effectiveness analysis. It appears that the rest of the world
is already paying attention to value for money.
The United States, on the other hand, is doing end runs around the issue
by using other mechanisms: restricting access, demanding higher
standards of evidence for new technologies, tolerating underutilization,
and so on.
Here in this country we rely a lot on the private sector: private health
care payers, managed care organizations, and insurers. Bernie Bloom
recently surveyed the people who identified themselves as the users of
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economic evaluation information in managed care organizations
(Bloom 2004). Forty-two percent of them said that they used costeffectiveness analysis or cost-benefit analysis. There may be others
who wouldn’t admit it, but some managed care organizations are
beginning to dip their toes in the water. They simply have to.
Distorted Incentives
Hospitals

Some hospitals are starting to use, or at least pay attention to, costeffectiveness analysis, but there are barriers. For a hospital, for
example, costs can be offset by revenues, and sometimes the incentives
get distorted a bit.
Take, for example, the case of drug-eluting stents. Drug-eluting stents
have been shown to reduce the incidence of repeat coronary
revascularization procedures, compared to bare metal stents. These
drugs, which flow through the arteries, prevent a restenosis of those
arteries that would otherwise require either more angioplasty
procedures, stents, or bypass operations. Drug-eluting stents are a
beneficial procedure that prevent subsequent bypass operations and
angioplasties, so they save money. But not for the hospital, because the
hospital can get paid to do those coronary bypass operations and
angioplasties, and so can the physicians and surgeons. As a result, from
the hospital’s point of view it’s a losing proposition to prevent bypass
operations and angioplasties. The incentives are distorted. Even though
the costs are reduced, the net revenue, the net income to the hospital, is
actually harmed. This is not the fault of the hospitals, but it’s the way
we’ve set things up in this country.
Insurers

Insurers tend to have a short-time horizon. If they’re for-profit they
have to satisfy their shareholders that they’ve got good earnings this
year. Besides, since most of their members are going to leave them
pretty soon, they don’t care much about cost savings five, ten, or
twenty years down the line. They care about costs now, and many times
the payment for those downstream procedures will be paid by
somebody else, like Medicare. So why prevent osteoporosis if by the
time the woman breaks her hip Medicare is responsible for her health
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care? We have multiple payers in this country. For that reason no single
payer has the incentive to capture all of the potential costs and savings.
Government Agencies

Even government doesn’t have all the incentives lined up. Agencies of
the government are not the same as The Government. They each have
their own annual budgets, and they erect tests of so-called budget
neutrality, which means, “We’re not allowed to do anything new this
year in our Medicaid organization unless it can be offset by some
savings.” So nothing new that can possibly provide health
improvement, maybe even very good value health improvement, will
get done unless it is demonstrably cost-saving as well.
And of course none of these decision makers consider patients’ or
families’ time and out-of-pocket expenses, which are part of the cost of
health care.

Conclusion
Medical specialty organizations have begun to at least refer to costeffectiveness analysis in support of practice guidelines. The most recent
cholesterol guidelines cite cost-effectiveness analyses showing that it’s
very cost-effective to give cholesterol-lowering drugs to people after a
heart attack, and, as I mentioned, the latest cervical cancer guidelines
recognize the value of human papilloma virus testing, and possibly less
frequent screening intervals.
Physicians are seeing a proliferation of cost-effectiveness analyses in
the leading medical journals. In fact, the Annals of Internal Medicine,
the journal of the American College of Physicians, has a special
structured abstract form for people who write cost-effectiveness
studies. Those of us who do those studies and publish in that journal
gladly adhere to those guidelines. So at least some physicians are
reading these studies. They’re going out there in the real world as
opinion leaders, educators, and practitioners and beginning to make
known that as physicians they have a responsibility to be gatekeepers—
informed, educated, sensitive to patient needs, but nonetheless
gatekeepers.
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We can’t do everything for everybody. We’ve got to make choices. But
we’re in a position to do it in both a humane and knowledgeable way.
Can cost-effectiveness analysis contain health care costs? Maybe it will
help. Will cost-effectiveness analysis improve health? I say yes, but
only if it is used.
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